While the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants, section 271 of the Act provides the Bell companies-but not GTE-additional incentives to cooperate. Using an original data set, I compare the negotiations of AT&T, as a local entrant, with GTE and with the Bell companies in states where both operate. My results suggest that the differential incentives matter: The Bells accommodate entry more than does GTE, as evidenced in quicker agreements, less litigation, and more favorable prices offered for network access. Consistent with this, there is more entry into Bell territories. 
I. Introduction
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 1 aims to open all telecom markets to competition, including the large and still mostly monopolized local markets. Section 271 and its implementation have been arguably the most contentious aspect of the 1996 Act. Supporters see 271 as an important tool for opening up local markets, because allowing a BOC into long distance before it has opened its local market would diminish its incentive to cooperate with entrants. Incentives would diminish for two reasons. Most obviously, a BOC will have less to gain from cooperating, having secured its desired entry authority (the so-called "carrot effect"). Secondly, it will have more to lose: because long-distance authority enables a BOC to offer also one-stop shopping for local and long-distance services, cooperating in opening the local market would diminish the BOC's profits in these additional markets for one-stop shopping that become available to it only after obtaining long-distance authority. Moreover, by requiring BOCs to relinquish significant control over their bottleneck facilities, section 271 reduces the risk that BOCs might use control of essential inputs to engage in anticompetitive practices in the long-distance market. Critics, however, maintain that 271 needlessly delays the BOCs' entry into long distance, because it is superfluous for opening local markets given the obligations already imposed by section 251 on all ILECs, while the BOCs pose no threat to competition in the long distance market. Less extreme critics argue that the benefits from increased local competition due to section 271 are small compared to the gains from BOC entry into long distance. 3 Therefore, a key question in the 271 debate-and more broadly-is whether regulatory obligations, together with generic antitrust and tort law, are sufficient to induce incumbents in network industries to cooperate efficiently and expeditiously in establishing the requisite conditions for competition. If not, then incentive devices such as the 271 mechanism may play a useful role. This paper addresses that question by comparing the conduct of BOCs towards local competitors with that of GTE-by far the largest non-BOC ILEC. Unlike the BOCs, GTE has been free since the 1996 Act to offer long-distance services jointly marketed with its local services; 4 correspondingly, one expects it to be less disposed to cooperating with local entrants.
There is a widespread perception that GTE's differential incentives make it more resistant than the BOCs in dealing with local competitors. This stance is said to have included more premature litigation and tougher requests in the arbitration process, and to have resulted in less entry in GTE's territories. However, the evidence for this view has been, so far, largely anecdotal (see Burns and Kovacs [1996] , [1997] ).
The aim of this paper is to test the differential conduct hypothesis more systematically. Using a comprehensive, originally assembled data set, I compare the negotiations of the same local entrant, AT&T, with GTE and with the BOCs in GTE's states. AT&T is chosen because it has been one of the most active CLECs in seeking access to incumbents' networks, and has made available to me data on its negotiations. I focus on GTE because it is by far the largest non-BOC ILEC, with a size comparable to the average BOC at the time (see Mini, 2001 , on AT&T's negotiation record with the other major non-BOC ILECs).
Under the Act, interconnection agreements are negotiated on a state-wide basis.
My data set covers negotiations between AT&T and GTE in 23 of GTE's 28 states. In 22 of these 23 states, a BOC also offers local service (the exception is Hawaii), and my data set also covers AT&T's negotiations with the BOC in each of these 22 states. The sample therefore provides a convenient natural experiment for comparing BOC behavior with that of the largest ILEC lacking the section 271 incentives, in their negotiations with the same local entrant while facing the same state regulatory commission.
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Note that my analysis does not attempt to determine if more accommodation of entrants is socially superior to less accommodation. To the extent that differential incentives might have led a BOC to be more cooperative than GTE, this cooperation might be excessive, and society would have been better off had the BOC stood its ground as GTE was able to do. Expressions such as "GTE is less cooperative" are thus used only in a positive sense, and should not be construed as implying any normative assessment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the regulatory framework established to open up local telephone markets to competition, and describes my data set. The next two sections use originally collected data to compare GTE and BOC behavior: section III compares the negotiation process-its length and the accompanying litigation; section IV reports and analyses parties' pricing requests in arbitration, for selected terms in the interconnection contracts, and arbitrators' decisions.
Section V presents the evidence about differences in entry levels in services areas served by GTE and the BOCs, based on a FCC's [1999] survey. Section VI concludes.
II. The Interconnection Negotiation Process and the Data Set
Sections 251 and 252 of the Telecom Act require incumbent LECs to cooperate with entrants in reducing artificial barriers to local competition. Section 251 requires
ILECs to enter into "interconnection agreements" with requesting CLECs to provide them: (1) interconnection to the ILEC local networks (i.e., arrangements for the exchange of traffic); (2) access to unbundled elements of ILEC networks; and (3) the ILEC's retail services at discounted wholesale rates, for resale by the entrants. Section 252 sets streamlined procedures for negotiation, compulsory arbitration absent voluntary agreement, and final approval by state public utility commissions.
Imposing such obligations on incumbents reflects a judgement that removing legal entry barriers alone would not be enough for competition to develop rapidly and efficiently in local markets (Farrell [1996] ). Incumbent LECs control the local networks in their regions, and still have the vast majority of local customers, and could use this control to discourage or delay entry by limiting the cooperation they extend to entrants.
The requirements imposed by the Act seek to facilitate entry through any of three modes:
entirely facilities based; leasing from the incumbent unbundled network elements; 6 and through resale of the incumbent's existing retail services. To succeed through any of these entry modes, an entrant requires significant cooperation from the incumbent LEC.
(i) The Negotiation Process Under Section 252
In order to speed up the process of signing such agreements, § 252 mandates a four-step negotiation procedure with highly compressed deadlines. resolve disputes in such cases. In practice, commissions have issued decisions on the disputed issues within the 9-month deadline, but the decisions were often incomplete or required parties to file additional information. In my sample, it was not at all uncommon for arbitration proceedings to be still pending nine months after the original request.
Second, even where a commission ostensibly resolves all issues, the parties must incorporate the arbitration decision into a voluntary contract; this leaves room for disputes over fine points. Importantly, there is no statutory deadline for the parties to submit a revised voluntary agreement after the arbitrator has resolved the disputed issues, and no provision for the commission to intervene in preparing this revised contract.
Consequently, considerably more than 9 months can elapse from the CLEC's initial request to the submission of a final contract for approval to the state commission.
(ii) The Data Set: AT&T's Negotiations with GTE and the BOCs
Shortly after the passage of the Act, AT&T embarked on a major national effort to enter local markets. Around March 1996, AT&T asked GTE for interconnection in 26 of the 28 states where GTE operates local networks. AT&T and GTE initially agreed to conduct negotiations at the national level, rather than for each state individually. This effort to reach agreement was unsuccessful, however, and state-by-state arbitration was invoked almost always.
My sample of negotiations between AT&T and GTE covers 23 of the 28 states where GTE offers local service. 8 In all 23 states, the negotiations ended up in arbitration.
In 22 of these 23 states, a BOC also offers local service (the exception is Hawaii). I also gathered information on AT&T's negotiations with BOCs in these 22 states.
Negotiations in all 22 cases ended in arbitration. I use the McNemar statistic (see Marascuilo and McSweeney [1977] ) to test the null hypothesis H 0 : "AT&T is equally likely to get to an approved agreement with GTE and the BOC" against the alternative hypothesis H 1 : "The likelihood of reaching an approved agreement is higher with the BOC." The data reported in Table I leads to rejecting H 0 at the 1% level of significance.
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Delay in Negotiations
The length of the negotiations is measured here as the time between AT&T's request for interconnection and the approval of the final contract by the state commission.
States where agreement was reached. In the 12 states where AT&T has an approved agreement with both GTE and the BOC, 11 times the agreement was reached with the BOC first (see Table A respectively.
In conclusion, while I cannot not rule out the possibility that AT&T's differential efforts might partially account for differences in the length of negotiations, there is reason to believe-especially in light of evidence (on premature litigation and pricing requests)
presented later in the paper-that BOCs' stronger incentives to cooperate with entrants as compared to GTE's did play a role in the outcome and length of negotiations.
(ii) Premature Litigation
In order to speed up negotiations, the Act denies state courts jurisdiction to review state commissions' actions in approving or rejecting an agreement. Parties may file claims only in federal courts, and only after a state commission has issued an order approving or rejecting the arbitrated (or negotiated) interconnection agreements.
"Premature litigation" is therefore used here to include claims filed prior to a final commission order, challenging either the arbitrator's decisions, or the commission's interlocutory orders. is safe to assume that the direct delay in negotiations caused by premature litigation was not great: a censored regression where the dependent variable is the length of negotiations between AT&T and GTE indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the cases where GTE litigated prematurely and when GTE did not. 18 On the other hand, the indirect impact of GTE's premature litigation on the bargaining process might have been quite significant. While GTE likely knew that the premature claim would eventually be dismissed with little impact on the negotiation process, contesting many of the arbitrated issues signaled to AT&T that the process would be expensive, and that it should not count on the approved contract as being truly final. After all, the dismissals by the federal courts never questioned the merits of the claims (that is, whether GTE's requests were actually fair), but simply postponed such investigation to the time the action was ripe. In other words, GTE's premature claims might well have discouraged competitive entry by increasing the uncertainty facing entrants and by increasing their expected costs through signaling a tougher posture. Table A3 in the Appendix reports premature claims filed in states where AT&T requested interconnection from both GTE and the local BOC. While GTE filed premature claims in 17 of the 23 sample states, the BOCs did so in only 3 of the 22. Of GTE's 17 premature claims, the courts dismissed 13, and GTE withdrew one. 19 All of the BOC-initiated suits were dismissed, and AT&T withdrew all of its premature motions. The disproportionate amount of GTE's premature litigation relative to the BOCs is striking, and appears to support the idea that differential incentives matter. GTE was relatively more willing than the BOCs to resort to the less predictable and slower court process as opposed to relying on private negotiation. Again, this does not imply per se that GTE was behaving anti-competitively.
IV. Parties' Pricing Requests in Arbitration and Arbitrators' Decisions
For the selected contract terms-resale discounts, unbundled loops, and endoffice switching-my data set covers not only the arbitrated awards, but also parties' initial offers. Therefore it can be used to examine whether-comparing GTE and the BOC in a given state, hence controlling for the role of state commissions-there is any systematic difference between GTE and the BOCs in their initial requests, and, if so, whether such differences are associated with different arbitration outcomes.
(i) Arbitration Methods
The FCC declined to establish arbitration rules, so state commissions are free to choose the arbitration mechanism to carry out their duties.
The two most common types of arbitration are conventional arbitration and finaloffer arbitration. Under the former, the arbitrator is free to impose any settlement (s)he sees fit; under the latter, the parties submit final-offer to the arbitrator, who must pick one or the other. When there are two or more issues under arbitration, final-offer arbitration can take two different forms: "package final-offer" where the arbitrator must pick one party's final offer in its entirety, and "issue-by-issue final-offer", where the arbitrator can fashion the settlement from the components of the parties' final offers.
In 18 of the 23 States in my sample, arbitration proceedings followed the conventional arbitration scheme. In the other five, 20 the state commissions ruled that the arbitrator should use "issue-by-issue" final-offer arbitration; however, if parties' final offers were clearly unreasonable or contrary to the public interest (that is, not consistent with federal and state law), the arbitrator had discretion to set contract terms different from either party's position. Thus, the arbitrators were free to revert to conventional arbitration as they saw fit. In four of these five states (the exception is Iowa), the arbitrators indeed reverted to conventional arbitration mechanism for at least one of the three issues I consider. In all states in my sample, therefore, the form of arbitration pursued in practice can be viewed as conventional rather than final offer.
(ii) Parties' Pricing Requests
Parties' pricing requests provide especially good evidence of relative aggressiveness: the terms offered for the same item by the BOC and GTE in a given state provide a direct measure of the relative stance taken in arbitration by the two types of incumbent monopolist. 21 Consistent with the differential incentive hypothesis of this paper, I find that GTE systematically makes tougher requests than do the BOCs. The evidence on arbitration awards is discussed later.
Resale Discounts
Resale of the incumbent LEC's services is the quickest entry mode for a competitor planning to penetrate the local market, as it requires no network investment before a subscriber base is established (in contrast to facilities-based or unbundledelements entry). 22 Under the Act, resale discounts are supposed to reflect the retailing costs an ILEC avoids when it sells to a CLEC at wholesale rather than selling to retail customers (costs of billing, marketing, etc.). Negotiations on resale discounts were carried out separately for residential and business subscribers. Resale discounts were quoted in percentages off the ILEC's retail price, both in parties' requests and in arbitration awards. Since retail prices might differ between GTE and BOC territories in each state, comparing percentage discounts is problematic, as a given percentage discount can yield different dollar discounts depending on the prices.
To deduce the dollar discounts corresponding to the parties' requests in arbitration, and the arbitrators' awards, ideally one would apply those percentage discounts to the actual local rates (net of taxes) charged by ILECs. Unfortunately, such data are not consistently reported.
However, using data from the Hatfield Model 23 and the FCC, I computed average monthly residential and business revenues per line, for each ILEC by state. 24 I then applied the percentage discounts quoted by the parties in arbitration to these dollar revenues to estimate the implied dollar discounts. Comparing the estimated dollar discounts for GTE and the BOC in a given state without adjusting for possible differences in their avoided retailing costs is appropriate under the assumption-widely supported in the industry-that differences in retail costs between GTE and BOC territories in a given state (and probably even across states) are likely to be relatively small.
Based on these estimated dollar resale discounts, I determined which ILEC in a given state (GTE or the BOC) offered the lower resale discount to an entrant for serving residential customers, from which ILEC AT&T requested the lower resale discount, and which ILEC received a lower resale discount in arbitration. Recall that a low resale discount is desirable for the ILEC and harmful for the entrant (here AT&T). These comparisons are summarized in Table III . Given that GTE offers the lower residential discount 15 times and the BOCs 3 times, a Sign Test rejects at the 1% significance level the null hypothesis H 0 : "GTE and the BOC are equally likely to make the tougher offer" against the alternative H 1 : "GTE is more likely to make the tougher offer." Conversely, the record on AT&T's residential discount requests (8:10) shows that AT&T is equally likely to make the tougher request to GTE or the BOC. Similar findings arise for resale discounts to serve business customers (see Table III ).
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Prices of Unbundled Network Elements: Loops and Switching
The comparison of prices of unbundled network elements does not suffer from the percentage problem arising for resale discounts, since price data in arbitration were quoted directly in dollars. However, one needs to control for differences in network costs across different service areas. Especially for loops, the cost of providing service depends critically on aspects such as customer density (which affects average loop length) and territory configuration, and it can vary quite dramatically between and within states.
To do so, I use cost estimates from the Hatfield Model. The Hatfield Model provides cost estimates for loops and end-office switching for each LEC in each state. I use those company-state specific figures to compute price/cost ratios for those unbundled elements; comparisons between GTE and BOCs are then carried out employing the computed ratios (rather than the raw price data).
For my purposes, Hatfield Model's cost estimates need not be exactly equal to the true cost of service for any LEC in any state: as long as the Hatfield Model does not systematically over-or under-estimate BOCs' costs relative to GTE's, it can serve as a meaningful benchmark to control for network costs in comparing the relative aggressiveness of GTE and the BOCs in their pricing demands.
Loops. Table IV summarizes state-by-state comparisons between parties' requests in arbitration and arbitrators' awards regarding price/cost ratios for loops. GTE has a tougher position in arbitration 11 times out of 16, which allows to reject the null hypothesis of no difference relative to the BOCs, but only at the 11% significance level.
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As with resale discounts, AT&T's requests do not seem to differ significantly between GTE and the BOCs. End-office switching. Test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference at the 10% significance level). Although AT&T may appear as "responding" by making smaller price/cost offers to GTE than to the BOCs (7 times out of 10), the null hypothesis that AT&T is equally likely to make the better offer to GTE or the BOC (against the alternative that the offer to GTE is tougher)
can only be rejected at the 18% significance level. Finally, I pooled the data on loops and switching and carried out Sign Tests on this pooled sample of unbundled network elements. The 17 times out of 23 where GTE rather than the BOC requested higher price/cost ratios allow rejection the hypothesis of equal conduct at the 5% significance level. AT&T made "tougher" (lower) requests to GTE 15 times out of 24, which is not enough to reject the hypothesis that AT&T treated BOCs and GTE equally at the 10% significance level.
Note that the evidence on parties' pricing requests in shows that AT&T's stance did not significantly differ between its negotiations with BOCs and GTE. Thus, the data in my sample do not support the suggestion that A&T longer delay in reaching agreements with GTE or its failure to do so (Section III(i)) is due to differential conduct by AT&T toward the BOCs versus toward GTE.
(iii) Arbitration Awards
The data in Tables III to V can be used to test if GTE's tougher requests result in correspondingly more favorable arbitration awards to it than to the BOC. Interestingly, they do not. Combining business and residential resale discounts (Table III) , GTE received a superior award in exactly half of the cases. Moreover, applying the Sign Test to residential and business resale discounts separately, the hypothesis of equal treatment by the arbitrator cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. Similarly, there is no systematic difference in GTE and BOC awards for loops and switches, both when these data are analyzed separately (Tables IV and V ) and when they are pooled.
The fact that GTE's awards were no better than the BOCs' might lead to conclude that its tougher requests were inconsequential. Such a conclusion, however, would overlook a potentially important effect: a tougher request by GTE could result in better awards to both it and the BOC in the state. In all my sample states, when a commission determined arbitration awards, it had access to both the GTE and BOC requests. Under the assumption that a commission might be reluctant to treat large ILECs-GTE and the BOC-very differently, one would not expect GTE's requests to yield significantly better awards than those received by the BOC. Nevertheless, tougher requests by GTE could induce better awards to both it and the BOC in that state. Focusing only on the difference would not capture this effect. To test this hypothesis, I examined how a request by one ILEC (GTE or the BOC) affects both its award and the award to the other ILEC.
Resale discounts. This is the contract term for which I have the most data points.
I regressed the arbitrated dollar discount awarded to the BOC in each state (ARBBOC) on a constant, AT&T's requests to the BOCs (ATTBOC), and both the BOC's and GTE's requests in that state (BOC and GTE respectively). Note: t-tests in parentheses; * significant at the 1% confidence level; ** significant at the 5% confidence level.
In the regression explaining the awards to the BOCs, the coefficients on BOC and Loop price/cost ratios. Note: t-tests in parentheses; * significant at the 5% confidence level; ** significant at the 10% significance level.
In the regression explaining GTE awards, the BOC's request is clearly insignificant, while GTE's and AT&T's are significant at the 10% level. (Again, the coefficient on ATTBOC is not statistically significant, either when included together with BOC or when it replaces this latter regressor.)
A possible interpretation of these findings is as follows. The state commission pays more attention to GTE's request, recognizing that the BOC is less willing to press its case (through legal challenges and otherwise) because the BOC is concerned that such challenges might adversely affect its prospect for securing long-distance entry authority. 28 The reluctance to award significantly different prices to GTE as compared to the BOC in the same state, however, results in both ILECs receiving higher awards than they would have had GTE made a "softer" request.
Could it be the case that, in determining the arbitrated award to GTE and the BOC respectively, state commissions pay attention only to GTE requests? This interpretation is consistent with the results reported in Table VII -where AT&T's and the BOC's position do not explain the arbitrated loop price/cost ratio in the BOC proceedings. On the other hand, the fact that in the regression explaining resale discounts to the BOC (Table VI) the coefficients on the variables BOC and ATTBOC are statistically significant might simply pick up differences between BOC and GTE markets.
To address this question, I re-estimated the regressions explaining the arbitrated resale discounts in the BOC proceedings reported in Table VI and VII including number of lines and subscribers' density in BOC service areas as proxies for differences in market characteristics. The results 29 show that, once market characteristics are accounted for, the arbitrated resale discount in the BOC proceedings still depends on AT&T's and the BOC's requests and GTE's position in that same state. In conclusion, while further work on an explicit model of the interaction among entrants, ILECs with and without long-distance authority and arbitrators might yield interesting insights, there appears to be evidence that GTE's relatively "tougher" bargaining position was not inconsequential.
V. Evidence on Competitive Entry Into Local Telephone Markets
GTE's less cooperative stance (more premature litigation, longer negotiations, and tougher pricing requests) is likely to discourage entry in its territories more than into BOC territories. Beyond the obstacles documented here (principally, delays or failure to reach interconnection agreements), GTE's less cooperative stance is also likely to include non-price conduct not explored in this paper but widely viewed as important (inferior technical platform arrangements, constraints on bundling of networks elements, etc.).
This section presents some evidence that GTE in fact has experienced less competitive entry, after controlling for other economic factors that might influence entry decisions. 
Unbundled Network Elements
For unbundled loops, the Sign Test rejects H 0 at the 1% significance level.
Moreover, using the Wilcoxon test, H 0 can be rejected at the 5% significance level. 34 As for collocation arrangements between ILECs and new entrants, H 0 is rejected without the need for any formal test since the BOC has the greater % in all cases.
(ii) Explaining Differences in Competitive Entry
Part of the observed differences in entry patterns could be due to factors other than GTE's weaker incentives to cooperate with entrants. ILECs often claim that entrants are mainly drawn by the prospect of "cream-skimming" customers to whom prices are well above cost (especially business customers), and stay away from areas where subscribers' density is low (and the cost of developing own networks is higher). Areas with relatively high per-line expenditure on toll and other non-local telephone services also could be more attractive to entrants, as the revenues from provision of one-stop shopping and integrated services are likely to be larger there. Moreover, there might be large fixed entry costs (e.g., fixed set-up costs, advertising), so it would not be surprising to see more entry into relatively larger ILECs' territories-such as those of the BOCs'. BellSouth in Florida). These explanatory variables consistently turned out to be statistically insignificant, so I omitted them. Note: t-tests based on robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 1% confidence level; ** significant at the 5% confidence level; *** significant at the 10% confidence level.
Entry Trough Resale
In the residential segment, there appears to be no difference between BOCs and non-BOC ILECs when other economic factors potentially affecting entry are taken into account. The only significant coefficient is the one for ILECs' size, which is positive and significantly greater than one. This indicates that entry through resale has targeted larger service areas. In interpreting the results that all other factors turned out to be insignificant, one needs to take into account that, as of December 1998, reporting ILECs resold to competitors only 1% of their switched residential lines.
By contrast, there were three times as many resold business lines as resold residential ones, and the results for business resold lines show that entry in BOC areas is statistically greater than that into areas served by non-BOC ILECs. This gives some support to the notion that the difference in entry records cannot be fully explained by differences in economic characteristics between BOCs and non-BOCs, and that differential incentives induced by section 271 are indeed playing a role. Regarding the other regressors, ILECs' size is still positively related to entry (with a coefficient statistically greater than one). In addition, price-cost margins-larger tariff/cost ratiosappear to be positively correlated with entry. As was found for residential resold lines, subscribers' density and the proxy for per-line toll expenditure are not significantly correlated with entry.
Finally, note that both regression were based on fewer than 79 observations. This is because some non-BOC ILECs reported zero entry in their regions. 41 The fact that the samples are non-randomly selected might result in a bias in the fitted parameters in the regression, as they confound the behavioral parameters of interest with those in the relationship determining the probability of positive entry.
To account for this issue, I used the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman [1979] ) to estimate the regressions above in a two-equation framework, where a probit equation explaining entry is employed to correct the sample selection bias. For all specifications of the probit regression explaining entry, I could not reject the hypothesis of no sample selection bias, based on the Lagrange multiplier test statistic proposed by Melino (1982) . Thus, no sample selection bias correction was applied. 42 Note: t-tests based on robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 1% confidence level, ** significant at the 5% confidence level; *** significant at the 10% confidence level.
Entry Through Unbundled Network Elements
Results are broadly consistent across the residential and business regressions.
Higher price-cost margins are associated with higher entry levels for both residential and business subscribers, while lower density is significantly correlated with less entry for both classes of subscribers. ILEC size plays no significant role in explaining residential entry; for the business segment, entry levels appear to increase with size, but at a decreasing rate. Finally, the proxy for toll expenditure is not correlated with either residential and business entry. 44 Most important for this paper, the BOC dummy is positive and strongly significant in both regressions: controlling for other factors, there is more entry in BOCs' service areas.
The empirical evidence on entry thus seems to support the hypothesis that the BOCs' stronger incentives to cooperate with local entrants do matter for entry modes that are most dependent on ILECs' cooperation-resale and UNEs as opposed to entirely facilities-based entry.
VI. Conclusions
The findings reported in the previous sections support the hypothesis that GTE's weaker incentives to cooperate with local entrants-arising because GTE, but not the BOCs, already may offer long-distance services unconditionally-have a significant impact on its conduct towards entrants.
In particular: 1) GTE engages in significantly more premature litigation than do the BOCs; 2) It takes significantly longer to obtain an interconnection agreement with GTE than with the BOCs; 3) GTE's pricing requests are consistently "tougher;" 4)
Tougher GTE requests are not associated with systematically better awards to GTE than to the BOC; however, a tougher GTE request is associated with better awards to both it and the BOC in that state (hence a worse outcome for the entrants); 5) An FCC (1999) survey shows less competitive entry into GTE than into BOC territories. After controlling for standard economic variables likely to influence profitability of entry, econometric analysis shows statistically significant higher levels of entry in BOC areas as compared to non-BOC ILECs', consistent with the differential incentives hypothesis.
The fact that GTE experiences less entry can reasonably be attributed to its greater resistance to cooperate with entrants. Beyond factors documented here (points 1-3 above), this resistance is also likely to involve non-price variables that are not explored in this paper but that are important to entrants.
GTE's greater resistance arises despite the fact that all incumbent LECs are required, under section 251 of the Telecom Act, to cooperate fully in opening up their local markets to entry. Unless the difference can be attributed entirely to inherently greater aggressiveness by GTE-of which there is little supporting evidence prior to the 1996 Act-a reasonable inference is that section 271 of the Act provides at least part of the explanation. Section 271 creates differential incentives by requiring the BOCs, but not GTE, to cooperate in opening their local markets to competition as a pre-condition for themselves being permitted to offer long-distance services originating in their regions.
My findings therefore suggest that regulatory sticks alone are not sufficient to encourage rapid and extensive cooperation by incumbents to open up their markets, and that additional incentive devices, such as those provided by section 271, can have a meaningful impact on incumbents' conduct and therefore on prospects for competitive entry. However, it bears reiterating that these findings, by themselves, cannot establish that section 271 is socially beneficial. To address this question would require examining issues such as whether BOC cooperation is "excessive' (e.g., below-cost prices for network access) and the costs (if any) due to delaying BOC entry into long-distance.
These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but warrant further research.
GTE provides local service in 28 states; my sample covers 23 of them. Table A1 lists all GTE states, the BOC in each state, and the outcome of the voluntary negotiations involving AT&T as a local entrant.
Assembling data on interconnection negotiations presented several difficulties.
First, it involved collecting information from a large number of different sources: state commissions, parties' state coordinators, associations of industry members, and federal bodies.
Second, the vast majority of the information comes from lengthy legal documents, including: parties' memos and exhibits presented during arbitration; arbitrators' decisions; commission orders (ratifying, or modifying some of the arbitrators' decisions);
and parties' complaints about arbitrators' or commissions' decisions. These documents had to be searched for relevant dates, parties' requests, and final decisions about contract terms; and this information then had to be recorded in an electronic format. The rest of the information was gathered by phone or via e-mail from the parties involved; or from the internet, especially from state commissions' web pages. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners keeps a list of them (www.naruc.org/stateweb.htm).
The data collection was hindered by the fact that, in general, information about negotiations is proprietary. This is true both of the parties' requests going into arbitration, and of the terms in the arbitrated interconnection agreement. In many instances, litigants were able to obtain from state commissions the right not to make the terms in the final contracts known to third parties, even though the contracts are the object of state commissions' orders, which are themselves public documents. As a result, assembling a totally complete data set proved to be impossible.
Even when information was available, in a few cases some inconsistencies emerged, which required additional investigation. For instance, dates for the same order from different sources did not always match, or the incumbent LEC reported arbitrated prices different from AT&T's understanding of the arbitrator's decision. Therefore, where possible, each piece of information was cross-checked for reliability.
Finally, after collecting the raw data, additional work was required to enable meaningful comparison between pieces of information reported in different levels of aggregation. Take, for instance, the case of loop prices. In some cases a state-wide average loop price is reported; in others, no state-wide figure is available, and loop prices are quoted at different levels of disaggregation (usually by density zones and/or by type of physical support, e.g., 2-wire or 4-wire).
Price/cost ratios for loops are computed based on average figures that capture the typical ILEC price (cost) for a loop across all loop-density areas and quality of service (analog or digital). When the parties involved (ILECs, AT&T, and the arbitrators) failed to quote directly an average figure, I derived it as a weighted average of the prices (by density areas and/or quality of services) using the breakdown of lines across the relevant classification as reported by the Hatfield Model.
As for end-office switching price/cost ratios, I computed them as follows. The
Hatfield Model reports for each ILEC in state the total number of end-office switching actual minutes and the corresponding total cost of providing such service. I used these figures to compute an average per-minute cost. End-office switching prices were usually quoted as a two-part tariff (a port fee plus a per-minute charge). I used the total number of switched lines and total number of end-office switching minutes reported in the Hatfield model to derive the typical per-minute revenue as implied by the two-part tariff. 2 The BOCs had been barred from interLATA services since the 1982 antitrust consent decree, which broke up the vertically integrated AT&T and resulted in the formation of the BOCs. The seven original BOCs were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell and U.S. West. There are now four, following the mergers between Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell and Ameritech, and between NYNEX and Bell Atlantic. Pursuant to the antitrust consent decree, Local Access Transport Areas (LATAs) were created and BOCs were confined to only carry calls originating and terminating within the same LATA. There are about 160 LATAs in BOC regions (thus, a state typically contains several LATAs). 3 See Schwartz (2000) for a detailed discussion of this debate. 4 GTE was never barred from long-distance services, but had been required to offer such services through a separate subsidiary, under the consent decree arising from its merger with Sprint. (Sprint was subsequently divested by GTE, and the separation requirements imposed on GTE were in litigation at the time of the 1996 Act.) The 1996 Act ended these separation requirements. 5 There is reason to believe that AT&T's experience is representative of at least the experience of other large IXCs in their role as local entrants negotiating with ILECs. The experience of smaller entrants may be less or more favorable. Smaller entrants could be an easier target for incumbent LECs; but they also are less threatening than the large IXCs, hence ILECs may choose to be more accommodating toward smaller entrants for purpose of "window-dressing" their 271 applications. Comparing the experience of small and large entrants is not attempted here, but would be an interesting extension. 6 In what follows, by unbundled elements entry mode I mean the case where competitors employ a combination of owned and leased facilities. 7 Even an entirely facilities-based entrant needs interconnection between its own, newly established network, and the incumbent's. Absent interconnection, the entrant's subscribers would not be able to communicate with the incumbent's subscribers. Since a network's value to a perspective customer depends critically on the number of persons who can be reached through it, an incumbent could stifle competition from entrants with a small installed base by setting price and non-price terms (e.g., quality) of interconnection, so as to deny an entrant's customers access to the positive networks externalities from communicating with the incumbent's more numerous subscribers. For recent analyses, see Tirole [1998a, 1998b] and Cremer, Rey, and Tirole [1999] . For a survey of economic literature on network externalities and the relevant bibliography, see Katz and Shapiro [1994] , and Besen and Farrell [1994] . 8 Excluded are two states where AT&T did not request interconnection (Alaska and Nevada), two states where AT&T decided to suspend its entry plans (Arkansas and Idaho), and one Arizona-GTE and AT&T agreed that the interconnection agreement reached in California would apply in Arizona as well) 9 The loops are either copper or fiber optic cables that connect the customer premises to the LEC's local offices (end-offices) where computers routing calls are located. End-Office switching is the use of the computers (switches) located in the end-offices to route traffic to or from end users to the rest of the telephone network. Entrants might also elect to simply redistribute the ILEC's retail services; in that case discounted wholesale rates for the ILEC's retail services need to be set. The resale discount rates are supposed to reflect the retailing costs an ILEC avoids when it sells to a CLEC at wholesale rather than selling to retail customers (costs of billing, marketing, etc.). 10 In what follows, I report data on the BOCs both individually and as a group. I consider the seven "original" BOCs, that is, before the PacTel-SBC-Ameritech and BellAtlantic-NYNEX merger. However, since GTE is not active in any NYNEX states, no data is reported for NYNEX. 11 It is reasonable to suppose that GTE too faces some costs of delaying local entry, in the form of regulatory or other sanctions, and that such costs result in an "interior solution" where GTE imposes only a finite delay (e.g., suppose the marginal benefit of delaying entry is constant, while the marginal cost increases with the length of delay, due to the disproportional likelihood or size of regulatory sanctions). This equilibrium delay will be shorter for the BOC since it faces an additional cost of imposing delay, viz., jeopardize its long-distance authority.
